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THE PERFECT TENDER RULE-AN "ACCEPTABLE" 
INTERPRETATION 
Michael A. Schmitt* and David Frisch** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T HE Uniform Commercial Code was designed to simplify, clar-ify, modernize, and make uniform the law of commercial trans-
actions. 1 As is sometimes the case, however, conflicts arise among 
various sections which tend to be resolved over the course of time 
through amendment, scholarly comment, and judicial interpretation. 
One conflict which seems to have resisted resolution for almost 
twenty years involves the buyer's right to reject under section 2-6012 
and the seller's right to cure under section 2-508(2).3 The conflict is 
* Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law. J.D., 1973, Yale Law 
School. 
** Assistant Professor of Law, Delaware Law School. J.D., 1975, University of 
Miami; LL.M., 1980, Yale University. 
1. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1978) provides, in part: 
Purposes; Rules of Construction; Variation by Agreement 
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its under-
lying purposes and policies. 
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions; 
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 
[hereinafter all references to the Uniform Commercial Code will be to the 1978 Offi-
cial Text]. 
2. U.C.C. § 2-601 reads: 
Buyer's Rights on Improper Delivery 
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment contracts 
(Section 2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual 
limitations of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719), if the goods or the tender of 
delivery fail in any respect to confrom to the contract, the buyer may 
(a) reject the whole; or 
(b) accept the whole; or 
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest. 
3. U.C.C. § 2-508 provides: 
Cure by Seller of Improper Tender or Delivery; Replacement 
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because non-con-
forming and the time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may sea-
1375 
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simple and straightforward. When a seller makes a nonconforming 
tender, the buyer in a sale of goods transaction may choose to exer-
cise his section 2-601 right to reject-often called the "perfect 
tender rule."4 Upon notice of rejection, however, the seller will often 
attempt to "cure" the defect, asserting the right to cure pursuant to 
section 2-508(2).11 To the extent that the seller's right to cure is 
broadly interpreted, the perfect tender rule becomes something less 
than perfect.6 To the extent that section 2-508(2) is narrowly inter-
preted, the perfect tender rule is strengthened. 
The focus of this article will be on the inherent conflict between 
the buyer's right to reject and the seller's right to cure. We will first 
review both the scholarly commentary addressing the issue and the 
judicial interpretations of the rejection-cure conflict. We will then 
propose a resolution to the conflict, or an acceptable interpretation, 
which serves to promote the expressed purposes and policies of the 
Uniform Commercial Code.7 
II. NON-CONFORMING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONFLICT 
A. The Commentators 
Interpreting the wording of section 2-508(2) and the appropriate 
scope of its applicability has proven no easy task for legal scholars. 
Professor Peters notes that the section fails to achieve its principal 
objective of preventing surprise rejections by unscrupulous buyers 
by being couched in "remarkably obscure" language.8 She focuses 
upon the reference to "monetary allowance" as being the section's 
principal ambiguity.9 In exploring three possible readings of this 
phrase, she finds that all either lead to implausible results or results 
sonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure and may then within the con-
tract time make a conforming delivery. 
(2) Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the seller had 
reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money al-
lowance the seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further rea-
sonable time to substitute a conforming tender. 
4. See Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 
206-09 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Peters]. 
5. See supra note 3. 
6. Peters, supra note 4, at 209-16. 
7. See supra note 1. 
8. Peters, supra note 4, at 210. 
9. Id. at 211-12. 
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contrary to public policy.10 She abandons her interpretative effort by 
concluding that section 2-508(2) should be amended to eliminate the 
confusion and that 2-601 should be redrafted to eliminate any out-
right power to reject. 11 
Professor Nordstrom asserts that the primary difficulty in inter-
preting section 2-508(2) lies in determining the subject of the 
"which" clause.12 He interprets the section as being applicable only 
to "sellers who knew their tender was non-conforming but who rea-
sonably believed that their buyers would accept the non-conforming 
tender-only to meet a surprise rejection."18 The basis of his reason-
ing is that the application of the section to any other seller would 
make the reference to monetary allowance redundant, as a seller 
who believes that his tender is conforming has no reason to consider 
a reduction in price.14 He further contends that as a matter of policy 
sellers who are mistaken as to the quality of their goods do not 
merit additional time to do what they agreed to do by a date which 
has already passed. 111 Beyond this he offers no further criteria upon 
which to ascertain when a seller has reasonable grounds to believe 
that a buyer would accept a nonconforming tender, one of the condi-
tions precedent to the right to cure as specifically set forth in section 
2-508(2). 
Another approach to the problem focuses upon the good faith of 
the seller in making the nonconforming tender and, in the alterna-
tive, upon the good faith of the buyer in rejecting such a tender.16 As 
one commentator writes: "This approach seems more sensible than 
any attempt to develop a rigid set of standards under which the fac-
tor of good faith (or true surprise) might be lost."17 We agree that 
the good faith of both buyers and sellers plays a central and possibly 
even pivotal part of the analysis of section 2-508(2) and its effect 
upon a buyer's right to reject for any nonconformity. We also be-
lieve, however, that the express wording of section 2-508(2) relieves 
not only the courts from the onerous task of determining contract 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 215-16. 
12. See R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES 319-22 (1970). 
13. Id. at 321. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. See Note, UCC Section 2-508: Seller's Right to Cure Non-Conforming 
Goods, 6 RuT.-CAM. L. REV: 387 (1974) [hereinafter cited as UCC Section 2-508]. 
17. Id.at400. 
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disputes based primarily on findings of the good or bad faith of the 
parties, but also relieves the parties themselves from the uncertain 
and unpredictable results which such determinations would necessa-
rily produce. 
Professors Summers and White argue: 
[A] seller should be found to have had reasonable cause to believe 
that his tender would have been acceptable any time he can convince 
the court that (1) he was ignorant of the defect despite his good faith 
and prudent business behavior or (2) he had some reason such as 
prior course of dealing or trade usage which reasonably led him to 
believe that the goods would be acceptable.'8 
While the second of the two suggestions reflects both sound reason-
ing and a valid interpretation of the comments to section 2-508, 19 we 
believe that to allow a seller, ignorant of the nature or quality of the 
goods which he sells, to cure under section 2-508(2) would encourage 
sloppy business practices and create a right to cure in virtually every 
instance. This approach is unfounded in the words or purposes of 
the subsection.20 To allow a merchant to assert ignorance as a justifi-
cation for the right to cure is to allow him to assert that which he, 
by definition, cannot claim. :n A merchant holds himself out to the 
public as being one with superior knowledge of the things which he 
sells. To allow such a seller to come into court, after the fact, and 
seek relief against a disillusioned buyer based upon ignorance, is to 
allow the seller to play a devilish and unconscionable trick upon the 
customers who placed their faith in him. 
18. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 322 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS]. 
19. Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-508 provides, in part: "However, the seller is not 
protected unless he had 'reasonable grounds to believe' that the tender would be ac-
ceptable. Such reasonable grounds can lie in prior course of dealing, course of per-
formance or usage of trade as well as in the particular circumstances surrounding the 
making of the contract." 
20. See infra Part III. 
21. U.C.C. § 2-104 contains the following definition of "merchant": 
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by 
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the 
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or 
skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other inter-
mediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or 
skill. 
(emphasis added). 
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Professors Summers and White further advocate forced money 
allowances for insubstantial nonconformities, even in the absence of 
a usage in trade obligating a buyer to accept such reductions.22 The 
professors assume the position that the section can be conformed 
"in wise judicial hands" so as to achieve the reasonable expectations 
of the parties and to thwart the "chiseler who seeks to escape a bad 
bargain."23 As will be pointed out shortly, there has been a paucity 
of wisdom guiding the judicial determinations of the 2-508(2) and 2-
601 relationship. The cases show that section 2-508(2) has been not 
so much directed against "chiseling" buyers but in favor of chiseling 
sellers. The professors leave their analysis of the section without ad-
dressing the scope and meaning of the word "acceptable." 
Probably the most pedestrian analysis and application of section 
2-508(2), and the one adopted by a number of courts, is suggested 
by Professor Hawkland.24 Hawland's test focuses upon the magni-
tude of the defect in determining whether a seller should be given 
an opportunity to cure.25 Under this analysis, a seller would be al-
lowed to cure a tender in all cases where the buyer would not be 
subjected to "any great inconvenience, risk or loss."26 Though ad-
mittedly offering the prospect of ease of application, this approach 
is not founded on the words of the section and diametrically opposes 
the clear purport of section 2-601.27 Again, as with the "good faith-
bad faith" approach, the parties are left facing ad hoc determina-
tions and the inconsistent results which these produce. The only dif-
ference here is that the focus is upon the magnitude of the defect 
involved rather than the good faith of the parties. Further, as with 
the "good faith-bad faith" approach, this analysis fails to take into 
22. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, at 322-23. 
23. Id. at 324. 
24. See Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels: Past, Pre-
sent and Commercial Code, 46 MINN. L. REV. 697 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 
Hawkland]. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 724. 
27. One commentator has pointed out that judicial decisions have failed to con-
sider the clear language of section 2-508(2) when legislating a "magnitude of the de-
fect" test. Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Rejection and Revocation-Seller's 
Right to Cure a Nonconforming Tender, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 938, 949 (1969). It is the 
authors' opinion that "[t]he major-minor defect test does not incorporate the element 
of seller's reasonable belief of acceptability of a tender and for this reason is unreflec-
tive of the statutory language." Accordingly, "the right to cure a nonconforming 
tender after the time for performance has passed shall depend upon whether the 
seller had reasonable grounds to believe the tender would be acceptable .... " Id. 
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account that there are differing standards of good faith with respect 
to merchant and nonmerchant buyers and that these differing stan-
dards have a bearing upon the effect of the magnitude of the defect. 
Essentially, a consumer buyer is obligated to exercise only "honesty 
in fact" in the transaction involved, a purely subjective standard.28 
A merchant, on the other hand, is additionally held to observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. 29 With 
this in mind, the possibility becomes apparent that defective goods 
which a consumer buyer, in all honesty, finds unacceptable could 
not, in good faith, be rejected by a merchant buyer.30 
A review of the scholarly commentary shows a wide divergence of 
opinion as to the proper interpretation of the section 2-601-2-
508(2) conflict. The factors suggested include the good faith of the 
parties, the magnitude of the defect in the product, prior course of 
dealing, and the amount of the monetary allowance. The result is 
that the academic literature fails to provide a concise and easily un-
derstandable resolution to the rejection-cure conflict. 
B. Judicial Interpretations 
It is not surprising to discover, after reviewing the various tests 
and criteria the commentators have proposed, that the language of 
section 2-508(2) has not received uniform interpretation by the 
courts when faced with actual contract disputes. What is surprising 
is the manner in which the courts have avoided, circumvented, and 
otherwise ignored the specific requirement of section 2-508(2) that 
before a seller may have time, in addition to that agreed to for per-
formance, in which to cure a nonconforming tender, he must have 
made such tender reasonably believing that it would be acceptable 
to the buyer.31 In fact, most courts, when presented with the issue of 
a seller's right to cure, have simply ignored the existence of the two 
subsections in section 2-508. It is often difficult to determine 
whether the disposition of a particular case was made pursuant to 
section 2-508(1) or section 2-508(2).32 
28. "Good faith" is defined in a general sense as "honesty in fact in the conduct 
or transaction concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19). 
29. In the case of a merchant, good faith requires, in addition to honesty in fact, 
the "observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." 
u.c.c. § 2-103(l)(b). 
30. See infra Part III. 
31. See supra note 3. 
32. See, e.g., Marine Mart, Inc. v. Pearce, 252 Ark. _, 480 S.W.2d 133 (1972); 
Summer 1982] PERFECT TENDER RULE 1381 
Any discussion of the application of section 2-508(2) by the 
courts must begin with the case of Wilson v. Scampoli. 33 This case 
involved a new color television set having a "reddish tinge" to the 
picture. Refusing to allow the seller to remove the set to make the 
inspection essential to determine the cause of the defective perform-
ance, the buyer first demanded a new set and then sought the return 
of her money. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial 
court granting rescission of the sales contract. Addressing itself to 
the seller's right to cure, the court stated: "[A] retail dealer would 
certainly expect and have reasonable grounds to believe that mer-
chandise like color television sets, new and delivered as crated at the 
factory, would be acceptable as delivered and that, if defective in 
some way, he would have the right to substitute a conforming 
tender."34 After finding that the seller had the right to cure, the 
question then before the court was "whether the dealer may con-
form his tender by adjustment or minor repair or whether he must 
conform by substituting brand new merchandise."311 The court went 
on to declare that adjustments in the nature of a "minor" repair 
would be an acceptable method of cure. 
Shortly after Wilson was decided, a similar situation presented 
itself in Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith. 38 Upon driving a new 
automobile home from the dealer's showroom, the buyer discovered 
that it was practically inoperable because of a transmission so defec-
tive as to require replacement. In its decision, the court focused on 
what was intended by the term "cure" as used in section 2-508.37 
The court refused to permit the dealer to substitute a new transmis-
sion, reasoning that the magnitude of this type of defect upset the 
peace of mind of the buyer and indeed shattered the buyer's faith in 
the vehicle. The court reasoned, "Once their faith is shaken, the ve-
hicle loses not only its real value in their eyes, but becomes an in-
strument whose integrity is substantially impaired and whose opera-
tion is fraught with apprehension. "38 What is conspicuously absent 
Transcontinental Refrigeration Co. v. Figgins, 179 Mont. 12, 585 P.2d 1301; Conte v. 
Devan Lincoln-Mercury, 172 Conn. 112, 374 A.2d 144 (1976); Hayes v. Hetinger, 228 
N.W.2d 181; Beco, Inc. v. Minnechaug Golf Course, Inc., 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 444, 256 
A.2d 522 (1968). 
33. 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967). 
34. Id. at 849. 
35. Id. 
36. 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 458, 240 A.2d at 205. 
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from the decision is any discussion regarding the seller's right to 
cure. 
Some courts have apparently read Wilson and Zabriskie as es-
tablishing a "magnitude of the defect" test for determining when a 
seller may have additional time within which to cure a defective 
tender, and have themselves applied such a test. In Reece v. Yeager 
Ford Sales, Inc., 89 the court cited Wilson and held: 
[U]nder the Uniform Commercial Code where the buyer rejects the 
goods or chattels when delivered because they are non-conforming, an 
offer can be made by or on behalf of the seller to repair or cure the 
minor defects, which should be accepted by the buyer and rescission 
could not be had. 40 
Wilson was also relied upon by the court in Beco, Inc. v. Min-
nechaug Golf Course, Inc.'1 in which the seller was permitted addi-
tional time to cure simply because the defects were characterized as 
minor. A final example of what appears to be the application of a 
"magnitude of the defect" test can be found in the relatively recent 
case of Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co.42 In the 
court's view "any right to cure should be limited to cases in which 
the defects are minor, and ... the seller has no right to cure defects 
which substantially impair the good's value."43 
A second theoretical approach to the interpretation and applica-
tion of section 2-508(2) implicitly adopted by some courts has been 
to focus on the element of good faith. 44 Since section 2-508(2) is 
aimed at protecting the seller from surprise rejections, courts have 
considered good faith surprise at a rejection as constituting "reason-
able grounds to believe that a [non-conforming tender] would be ac-
ceptable." For example, in Wilson perhaps one of the major factors 
that went into the court's decision allowing the seller to cure was the 
fact that the television set was delivered in its original crate. Deliv-
39. 155 W. Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 722 (1971). 
40. 184 S.E.2d at 725 (emphasis added). 
41. 5 Conn. Cir. 444, 256 A.2d 522 (1968). 
42. 304 N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 1981). 
43. Id. at 657. 
44. See, e.g., Boysen v. Antioch Sheet Metal, Inc., 16 Ill. App. 3d 311, 306 N.E.2d 
69 (1974); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968); 
Bartus v. Riccardi, 55 Misc. 2d 3, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222 (N.Y. City Ct. 1967); Appleton 
State Bank v. Lee, 33 Wis. 2d 690, 148 N.W.2d 1 (1967); Traynor v. Walters, 342 F. 
Supp. 455 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967). 
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ery of a factory crated product in ignorance of the defect may have 
constituted for this court one kind of reasonable tender.0 In effect, 
the court found that the seller was acting in good faith in delivering 
the television set even though it delivered a nonconforming televi-
sion set. This approach may also explain why a different result was 
reached in Zabriskie. The dealer had argued that it is the usage of 
the automobile trade that a buyer accept a new automobile, al-
though containing defects of manufacture, if such defects can be and 
are seaonably cured by the seller. The court admitted that such a 
custom may exist but nevertheless rejected it, stating, "[p]erhaps 
this represents prevailing views in the automobile industry which 
have, over the years, served to blanket injustices and inequities com-
mitted upon buyers who demurred in the light of the unequal posi-
tions of strength between the parties.'"'8 From this statement one 
gets the impression that the court was not favorably impressed by 
the actions of this particular seller nor, for that matter, by the ac-
tions of the entire automobile industry. 
The seller's good faith may also have been the determinative fac-
tor in Bartus v. Riccardi. 47 The buyer had purchased a specified 
model of hearing aid, but was delivered a different but "new and 
improved" model. After experiencing difficulty with the hearing aid 
and discovering that it was not the specific one ordered, the buyer 
returned it to the seller and refused to deal further with him. 
Though very little was said about the language of section 2-508(2), 
the court held that the seller had the right to cure because "under 
the circumstances the seller had reasonable grounds to believe that 
the newer model would be accepted . . . .''48 It is certainly difficult 
to question the good faith of a seller who delivers a newer or ostensi-
bly better good than that required by the sales contract. 
A third theoretical approach has been based on an interpretation 
of the phrase "further reasonable time" found in section 2-
508(2)-focusing on what is a reasonable time and indeed how long 
the seller is permitted to try to cure a nonconforming tender. A 
buyer has been permitted to reject after unsuccessful efforts by the 
seller to cure or where it is apparent that the particular defect can-
not be cured.49 Where the seller has attempted to cure but has failed 
45. Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967). 
46. Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. at 456, 240 A.2d at 204. 
47. 55 Misc. 2d 3, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222 (N.Y. City Ct. 1967). 
48. Id. at 6, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 225. 
49. See, e.g., Marine Mart, Inc. v. Pearce, 252 Ark. 601, 480 S.W.2d 133 (1972); 
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to do so, the courts, by a simple shift of focus, have been able to 
completely ignore the question of whether the seller had a right to 
cure in the first place.110 
All of the above cases are, we feel, of doubtful authority on the 
question of a seller's right to cure under section 2-508(2). In each 
case the contract did not specify a date for delivery. It may be ar-
gued that the disposition in each case actually could have been 
made pursuant to section 2-508(1), applying the standard of section 
2-309(1) that where no time for shipment or delivery is set forth, 
delivery is to be made within a "reasonable time. "111 If a seller's right 
to cure depends upon application of section 2-508(1) then, of course, 
the seller's belief in the acceptability of the tender becomes irrele-
vant. This may explain the lack of attention given to this require-
ment by the courts. The only decision discussed so far which does 
allude to the requirement of reasonable belief in the acceptability of 
the goods is Wilson; however, in Wilson the court simply equated 
the word "acceptable" with the word "conforming" by concluding 
that if the seller is unaware that the tender is nonconforming, then 
he has "reasonable grounds to believe [that a non-conforming 
tender] would be acceptable."112 The focus of the court's attention 
was not on the right to cure but on the appropriate method of ef-
fecting a cure. The same is true for the decision in Zabriskie in 
which the court assumed a right to cure and focused only on what 
constitutes an acceptable method of cure.118 If these two cases estab-
lish a "magnitude of the defect" test, such a test would only be rele-
vant when determining the permissible method of cure, not when 
determining whether the seller has the right to cure. 
Two cases deserve special mention because in both the courts 
did not blind themselves to the "reasonable grounds to believe 
would be acceptable" language in section 2-508(2) and did attempt 
to impart some meaning to this phrase. In Meads v. Davis,114 the 
Conte v. Devan Lincoln-Mercury, 172 Conn. 112, 374 A.2d 144 (1976); Hayes v. Het-
tinga, 228 N.W.2d 181(Iowa1975); Transcontinental Refrig. Co. v. Figgins, 179 Mont. 
12, 585 P.2d 1301 (1978). 
50. See cases cited supra note 49. 
51. U.C.C. § 2-309 provides, in part: 
Absence of Specific Time Provisions; Notice of Termination 
(1) The time for shipment or delivery or any other action under a contract 
if not provided in this Article or agreed upon shall be a reasonable time. 
52. Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967). 
53. Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968). 
54. 22 N.C. App. 479, 206 S.E.2d 868 (1974). 
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court stated: 
Obviously this section deals with the situation in which the seller 
knows prior to delivery that the goods are not in conformity, but has 
reason to believe that the buyer will accept. An example of such a 
situation might be where the buyer orders goods no longer carried by 
the seller, but the seller has goods which will perform the same 
function. 55 
The court then concluded, however, that the time for performance 
had not expired and permitted the seller to cure pursuant to section 
2-508(1), thereby relegating its discussion of section 2-508(2) to 
dicta. 
The second case is Joe Oil USA, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. 
of New York. 56 After concluding that the seller's time for perform-
ance had expired, the court focused on the language of section 2-
508(2). The court agreed with the foregoing statement in Meads 
that section 2-508(2) will permit a seller to cure if he had pre-deliv-
ery knowledge of the nonconformity but nevertheless reasonably be-
lieved the tender would be accepted. The court, however, refused to 
accept the assertion that the application of section 2-508(2) is lim-
ited exclusively to such circumstances, writing: 
The remedy should be available to any seller who has a reasonable 
good faith ground to believe that the original shipment would be ac-
cepted. The dichotomy sought to be advanced by the Nordstrom dis-
ciples (which would bar redress·to those without predelivery knowl-
edge of conditions causing non-conformity, but affords relief to those 
who ship despite knowledge of defect or non-conformity) is totally 
convoluted, unjust and incongruent. The innocent seller who ships his 
goods in good faith, reasonably believing that they are conforming and 
acceptable would be given no relief or redress, but all of the curative 
power of the statute would be made available to a more culpable seller 
who delivers his non-conforming wares despite existing knowledge of 
its [sic] defective, non-conforming qualities. It is difficult to believe 
that a construction rewarding culpability and penalizing innocence is 
preferable, or consistent with the remedial intent of the creators of 
this remedy. To the contrary, this Court believes that more compel-
ling equitable considerations exist to extend the § 2-508(2) remedy to 
those innocent sellers who have no prior predelivery knowledge of 
non-conformity, and only first learn of a defect following a purchaser's 
55. Id. at _, 206 S.E.2d at 869. 
56. 107 Misc.2d 376, 434 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). 
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post-delivery rejection of the merchandise as non-conforming. This 
construction facilitates the Code's mandate of liberal construction 
(UCC § 1-102) and administration (UCC § 1-106[1]) based upon an 
imposed obligation of good faith in performance and enforcement 
(UCC § 1-203).111 
The judicial resolution of the rejection-cure conflict represented 
by these cases is by no means clear. There appears to be a tendency 
to avoid the conflict by resolving the disputes under section 2-
508(1). If this cannot be accomplished because the time for perform-
ance has clearly elapsed, courts seem to follow the myriad of factors 
suggested by the academic literature. Resolution of the conflict is 
determined by various tests, including the magnitude of the defect, 
the good faith of the buyer or seller, or the ease and ability of the 
seller to cure. As Summers and White admit, "How one generalizes 
from the ... cases ... is not clear."118 The current state of the law 
on the applicability of section 2-508(2) is probably best stated by 
Professor Miniter.119 After reviewing a number of cases decided 
under this section, he concludes that the courts have focused on 
both the substantiality of the defect and the good faith of the par-
ties and states that "[c]ure has therefore become discretionary."60 
III. AN ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION OF THE REJECTION-CURE 
CONFLICT 
As should be apparent at this point, considerable interpretive 
difficulties have surrounded section 2-508(2) and its interaction with 
section 2-601. Courts and commentators alike have addressed the 
issue of the proper scope and application of the allegedly ill-drafted 
provision and a myriad of analyses have resulted. We believe that 
neither difficulty nor confusion need accompany an understanding 
and application of section 2-508(2). If a clear, reasonable, and prac-
ticable interpretation of the section is achieved, the section can be-
come a useful tool in promoting the objectives of the Code without 
the need for redrafting. 
Although section 2-601 permits the buyer to reject the whole if 
57. Id. at 389-90, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 632. 
58. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, at 321. 
59. See Miniter, Buyer's Right of Rejection: A Quarter Century Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, and Recent International Developments, 13 GA. L. REV. 805 
(1979). 
60. Id. at 835. 
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the goods or tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the 
contract,81 other sections impact on the buyer's right to reject and 
consequently narrow the scope of section 2-601. When the seller is 
required or authorized to send goods to the buyer, section 2-504 
specifies that the seller's shipment duties include making a proper 
contract for shipment, obtaining and tendering the necessary ship-
ping documents, and promptly notifying the buyer of the ship-
ment. 82 The seller's failure to meet these requirements results in an 
improper tender of delivery,83 giving rise to the buyer's section 2-601 
61. See supra note 2. 
62. U.C.C. § 2-504 provides: 
Shipment by Seller 
Where the seller is required or authorized to send the goods to the buyer 
and the contract does not require him to deliver them at a particular destina-
tion, then unless otherwise agreed he must 
(a) put the goods in the possession of such a carrier and make such a 
contract for their transportation as may be reasonable having regard to 
the nature of the goods and other circumstances of the case; and 
(b) obtain and promptly deliver or tender in due form any document 
necessary to enable the buyer to obtain possession of the goods or other-
wise required by the agreement or by usage of trade; and 
(c) promptly notify the buyer of the shipment. 
Failure to notify the buyer under paragraph (c) or to make a proper contract 
under paragraph (a) is a ground for rejection only if material delay or loss 
ensues. 
63. U.C.C. § 2-503 provides, in part: 
Manner of Seller's Tender of Delivery 
(1) Tender of delivery requires that the seller put and hold conforming 
goods at the buyer's disposition and give the buyer any notification reasonably 
necessary to enable him to take delivery. The manner, time and place for 
tender are determined by the agreement and this Article, and in particular 
(a) tender must be at a reasonable hour, and if it is of goods they must 
be kept available for the period reasonably necessary to enable the 
buyer to take possession; but 
(b) unless otherwise agreed the buyer must furnish facilities reasonably 
suited to the receipt of the goods. 
(2) Where the case is within the next section respecting shipment tender 
requires that the seller comply with its provisions. 
(3) Where the seller is required to deliver at a particular destination tender 
requires that he comply with subsection (1) and also in any appropriate case 
tender documents as described in subsections (4) and (5) of this section. 
(5) Where the contract requires the seller to deliver documents 
(a) he must tender all such documents in correct form, except as pro-
vided in this Article with respect to bills of lading in a set (subsection 
(2) of Section 2-323); and 
(b) tender through customary banking channels is sufficient and dis-
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rejection right, 84 however, section 2-504 provides that failure to no-
tify the buyer of the shipment or failure to make a proper contract 
for shipment is a ground for rejection only if material delay or loss 
ensues. Therefore, the section 2-601 right to reject arising from an 
improper tender of delivery will not automatically relieve the buyer 
of his section 2-30180 duty to accept and pay. 
A further limitation of the buyer's right to reject occurs with a 
section 2-612 installment contract.88 Since, by definition, an install-
ment contract is one which requires or authorizes delivery of goods 
in separate lots,87 the buyer's section 2-601 right to reject is qualified 
in such contracts to situations where "the non-conformity substan-
tially impairs the value of that installment and cannot be cured or if 
the non-conformity is a defect in the required documents; . . . if the 
non-conformity does not ... substantially [impair] the value of the 
whole contract [so that] there is a breach of the whole," then the 
buyer must accept the nonconforming installment if the seller gives 
adequate assurances of its cure.88 
Subsection (1) of section 2-508 is clear in its intent and purpose 
and has not given rise to significant judicial conflict. When a buyer 
honor of a draft accompanying the documents constitutes non-accept-
ance or rejection. 
64. See supra note 2. 
65. U.C.C. § 2-301 provides: 
General Obligations of Parties 
The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the buyer 
is to accept and pay in accordance with the contract. 
66. U.C.C. § 2-612 provides: 
"Installment Contract"; Breach 
(1) An "installment contract" is one which requires or authorizes the deliv-
ery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted, even though the con-
tract contains a clause "each delivery is a separate contract" or its equivalent. 
(2) The buyer may reject any installment which is non-conforming if the 
non-conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment and cannot 
be cured or if the non-conformity is a defect in the required documents; but if 
the non-conformity does not fall within subsection (3) and the seller gives ade-
quate assurance of its cure the buyer must accept that installment. 
(3) Whenever non-conformity or default with respect to one or more install-
ments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract there is a breach of 
the whole. But the aggrieved party reinstates the contract if he accepts a non-
conforming installment without seasonably notifying of cancellation or if he 
brings an action with respect only to past installments or demands perform-
ance as to future installments. 
67. u.c.c. § 2-612(1). 
68 .. u.c.c. § 2-612(3). 
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uses his right to reject a nonconforming tender or delivery, and the 
time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may cure by 
making a conforming tender if he can do so within the contracted 
time for performance.89 In effect, this is a no-harm, no-foul rule. As-
suming the seller can cure within the contract time, no harm falls 
upon the buyer. Thus, the Code expressly prohibits the buyer in this 
situation from using his right of rejection to get out of the contract. 
Wise sellers can use this section to prevent rejections by specifying a 
definite date of delivery, and tendering before that date. Should a 
defect appear when the buyer inspects, the seller can cure and still 
be protected by the fact that the time for performance has not yet 
run. 
When, however, the time for performance has run and the buyer 
rejects, the seller's right to cure is limited by section 2-508(2). It is 
the interpretive difficulties of this section that have given rise to all 
the confusion. Comment 2 explains that the purpose of subsection 
(2) is to "avoid injustice to the seller by reason of a surprise rejec-
tion by the buyer."70 It adds that the seller is not protected "unless 
he had 'reasonable grounds to believe' that the tender would be ac-
ceptable ".11 As we have noted above, academic commentary has fo-
cused primarily on the "reasonable grounds to believe" and the 
"with or without money allowance" phrases of section 2-508(2).72 
Additional comment has been addressed to the good faith require-
ments in all Code sections mandated by section 1-203,73 and a sub-
stantial-insubstantial test nowhere to be found in section 2-508(2) or 
its official comments. 7" We have not found any commentary on the 
word "acceptable," the word we believe is the key to understanding 
the limits of the seller's right to cure. 711 
The word "acceptable" is nowhere defined in the Code, although 
what constitutes an "acceptance" is.78 Under section 2-606 the buyer 
69. See supra note 3. 
70. U.C.C. § 2-508, Comment 2. 
71. Id. (emphasis added). 
72. See supra Part IA and notes 4, 12 & 17. 
73. See UCC Section 2-508, supra note 16. 
74. See Hawkland, supra note 24. 
75. The academic commentary focusing on section 2-508(2) has been discussed in 
Part IA supra. None of this commentary addressed the word "acceptable." At best, 
they equated it, as the courts have done, with the word "conforming." 
76. U.C.C. § 2-606 provides: 
What Constitutes Acceptance of Goods 
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer 
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is deemed to have accepted the goods if he: a) signifies to the seller 
that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in 
spite of their nonconformity, b) fails to make an effective rejection 
by notifying the seller within a reasonable time after the delivery of 
the goods, or c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's owner-
ship. 77 If the meaning of the word "acceptable" as used in section 2-
508(2) can be found by reference to the Code's definition of accept-
ance in section 2-606, the seller's right to cure would have to arise in 
situations where the seller had reasonable grounds to believe that 
the buyer would retain the goods in spite of their nonconformity. 
Surely the seller does not anticipate that a buyer would reject goods 
and still do an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership. Equally 
certain is that a seller could not reasonably expect that a buyer 
wanting to reject would not do so in a reasonable time with proper 
notice. In fact, paragraphs (b) and (c) of subsection 2-606(1) are 
rather like penal provisions, creating a statutory acceptance when 
the buyer has ineffectively rejected or used the goods as if he had 
accepted. The major consequence of having found an acceptance is 
that the buyer, once having accepted the goods, can only revoke his 
acceptance in accordance with section 2-608.78 This section essen-
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the 
seller that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them 
in spite of their non-conformity; or 
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of Section 2-602), 
but such acceptance does not occur until the buyer has had a reasonable 
opportunity to inspect them; or 
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such act 
is wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by 
him. 
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that entire 
unit. 
77. Id. 
78. U.C.C. § 2-608 provides: 
Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part 
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose 
non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it 
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be 
cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or 
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was rea-
sonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance 
or by the seller's assurances. 
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the 
buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any 
substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own 
defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it. 
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tially limits revocations to situations where the nonconformities are 
substantial in nature. 79 Consequently where, prior to acceptance, a 
buyer could reject for any nonconformity,80 after acceptance a buyer 
can revoke his acceptance only if a substantial nonconformity ex-
ists. 81 If, therefore, the meaning of the word "acceptable" is equated 
solely with the section 2-606(1)(a) definition of "acceptance," the 
crucial phrase in section 2-508(2) would read: "which the seller had 
reasonable grounds to believe would be retained by the buyer in 
spite of their nonconformity .... "Read this way, the seller's right 
to cure would only arise in situations where the seller knew before-
hand that the goods were not conforming, but had reasonable 
grounds to believe they would be accepted in spite of their noncon-
formity. Such reasonable grounds of belief arise from various con-
texts, including prior course of dealing, course of performance, and 
usage of trade, as well as in the particular circumstances surround-
ing the making of the contract.82 
Equating the word "acceptable" with the section 2-606(1)(a) 
phrase "retain[ed by the buyer] in spite of their non-conformity" 
suggests very clearly-defined situations that give rise to the seller's 
right to cure. Under the facts of Bartus v. Riccardi,88 a seller who 
knows that the goods are not conforming because they are not the 
exact goods requested, but rather a newer and improved model of 
hearing aid for the same price, could rely on the particular circum-
stances of the case to assert reasonable grounds to believe that the 
buyer would retain them in spite of their nonconformity. Indeed, 
any seller providing at the contract price newer or better goods than 
the contract calls for would be "surprised" by the buyer's rejection. 
One could also find a rejection "surprising" where a seller delivers 
nonconforming goods to the buyer, the nonconformity arising be-
cause the seller did not have the quantity in stock required by the 
terms of the contract. If the seller deducted from the price the 
amount not delivered, and this kind of deduction was a practice in 
the trade, the buyer's rejection would indeed be surprising. These 
two examples provide instances where the seller's right to cure 
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to 
the goods involved as if he had rejected them. 
79. Id. 
80. See supra note 2. 
81. See supra note 7. 
82. See U.C.C. § 2-508, Comment 2. 
83. 55 Misc.2d 3, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222 (N.Y. City Ct. 1967). 
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seems proper. If section 2-508(2) were read to be limited to situa-
tions where the seller knew beforehand that the goods were not con-
forming, and had reasonable grounds to believe that the buyer 
would retain them in spite of their nonconformity, the "perfect 
tender rule" as embodied in section 2-601 would remain strong and 
its exceptions would be few. In addition, the scope of the seller's 
right to cure would be well-defined and clear and could be applied 
with the kind of uniformity the Code desires to achieve. 84 
Our review of the judicial constructions of section 2-508(2) 
shows, however, that clarity and uniformity are not so easily 
achieved. Perhaps most of the confusion surrounding section 2-
508(2) has its origin in the holding of Wilson v. Sampoli.86 As noted 
above, the court in that seminal case refused to permit the buyer of 
a defective television set to reject and end the transaction at that 
point. Rather, the court held that the seller had a right to cure 
under section 2-508(2) and that the buyer had breached by not per-
mitting the seller to remove goods from the buyer's premises to ef-
fectuate a cure.88 The Wilson court accepted the seller's argument 
that it had reasonable grounds to believe the goods would be accept-
able because the television delivered was a brand new, uncrated tel-
evision. The seller's argument was that he thought the goods would 
be conforming (and therefore acceptable) because the seller was a 
retail middleman, and had no reason to suspect that the television 
was defective.87 The effect of this decision was to set a precedent 
that permitted sellers to assert the right to cure in situations where 
they did not know beforehand that the goods were nonconforming. 
The decision naturally broadens the class of sellers who have a right 
to use section 2-508(2), and correspondingly narrows the situations 
in which the seller can effectively assert the right to reject, and 
thereby cancel the contract.88 It also gives rise to the notion that any 
time a seller had reasonable grounds to believe the goods were con-
forming, it would be permitted an additional reasonable time to cure 
the defect. This enlarges the class of sellers able to invoke the sec-
tion 2-508(2) right to cure to such an extent that it is easy to under-
stand how courts quickly seized on the substantial-insubstantial de-
fect test suggested by some commentators to preserve, to some 
84. See supra note 1. 
85. 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967). 
86. Id. at 849. 
87. Id. 
88. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18. 
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extent at least, the buyer's right to reject and cancel. 89 
We believe that there are two serious flaws in the position taken 
by the Wilson court, the first involving equating the word "con-
forming" with section 2-508(2)'s "acceptable," the second involving 
the generation of a substantial-insubstantial defect standard never 
provided for in the interplay between section 2-601 and section 2-
508. The notion that the word "acceptable" used in section 2-508(2) 
can be substituted with the word "conforming" can be dispelled im-
mediately by the realization that the drafters did not say "con-
forming." If the drafters had meant to say "conforming", it would 
not have been difficult to use that word in light of the fact that 
"conforming" is defined in the Code.90 A better approach is to take 
the position that the drafters said what they meant and meant what 
they said, namely "acceptable." Furthermore, equating the two 
words raises serious policy questions. Sellers at the retail level would 
too easily be allowed to duck their primary duty of tendering con-
forming goods.91 This result necessarily follows because such retail 
sellers would always be allowed to cure defective goods that they 
delivered uncrated and unexamined by alleging that they assumed 
the goods were conforming. With the availability of cure ever pre-
sent, such sellers have little reason to inspect goods prior to delivery, 
naturally resulting in fewer conforming tenders.92 A second reason 
that equating the words "conforming" and "acceptable" is bad pol-
icy is a corollary to the first. The burden of discovering defects is 
unduly placed upon the buyer. While a buyer is charged with the 
responsibility of inspecting the goods which he purchases,93 he 
should not be the one charged with the duty of weeding out factory-
grown bad apples. This is especially true when consumer buyers are 
involved. Consumer buyers of goods such as television sets, refriger-
89. See Hawkland, supra note 24. 
90. "Goods or conduct, including any part of a performance, are 'conforming' or 
conform to the contract when they are in accordance with the obligations under the 
contract." U.C.C. § 2-106(2). 
91. See supra note 65. 
92. See supra note 90. 
93. U.C.C. § 2-513 provides, in part: 
Buyer's Right to inspection of Goods 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed and subject to subsection (3), where goods are 
tendered or delivered or identified to the contract for sale, the buyer has a 
right before payment or acceptance to inspect them at any reasonable place 
and time and in any reasonable manner. When the seller is required or author-
ized to send the goods to the buyer, the inspection may be after their arrival. 
See also supra note 76, at 2-606(1)(a). 
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ators, automobiles, and other appliances have certain expectations 
with regard to their purchases. When such a buyer discovers that 
the item purchased is defective, he is forced to suffer the frustration 
(sometimes exceedingly high) and the delay of jousting with the 
seller for a remedy. Often the remedy comes in the form of repair. 
Even assuming that the repair is sufficiently accomplished, the 
buyer is left having bought and paid for something he did not agree 
to purchase-a repaired item. 
An equally serious objection to equating the words "acceptable" 
and "conforming" arises from courts which attempt to limit the 
broad class of sellers such an equation begets by adopting a "magni-
tude of defect" test. 94 The drafters of the Code expressly provide for 
such a test in two instances-for goods which have been accepted 
and for installment contracts. 911 Good policy reasons for using such a 
test in these two situations are apparent. Restricting buyers who ac-
cept goods to revocation only for substantial defects encourages buy-
ers to make use of their section 2-513 right to inspection and their 
corresponding section 2-601 right to reject for any nonconforJD,ity. 
With installment contracts, the substantial defect test resolves the 
confusion under common law as to when and if buyers could extri-
cate themselves from contracts requiring a series of deliveries by al-
leging a minor nonconformity in one of the shipments. 98 The rigid 
requirement of section 2-612(2) limiting the buyer's right to revoke 
acceptance for substantial breaches which cannot be cured91 encour-
ages the adjustment and completion of such contracts, thus facilitat-
ing modern commercial transactions. 98 
The application of a magnitude of the defect test in situations 
where an acceptance is not found, however, is somewhat puzzling. As 
mentioned above, application of such a test in rejection cases is 
clearly contrary to the intent and purport of section 2-601. It also 
finds no express support anywhere in the Code. Furthermore, appli-
cation of such a test clearly ignores the distinction which the Code 
makes between cases where an acceptance has occurred and those 
where it has not. Implying such a test from the language of section 
2-508(2) amounts either to blindness or plain disregard for the fact 
94. See Beco, Inc. v. Minnechaug Golf Course, Inc., 5 Conn. Cir. 444, 256 A.2d 
522 (1968), Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co., 304 N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 
1981); Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, 155 W. Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 722 (1971). 
95. See supra notes 66 & 78. 
96. See Peters, supra note 4, at 223-27. 
97. See supra note 66. 
98. See supra note 1. 
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that the drafters did not intend a magnitude of the defect test to 
attend the right to reject. If they had, the drafters would have sim-
ply written it into the Code with as much ease as they did when 
drafting section 2-608. 
Assuming, therefore, that the drafters of the Code specifically 
chose to use the word "acceptable" as distinct from the word "con-
forming," we are back to the position that the only sellers given a 
right to cure by section 2-508(2), and the further reasonable time to 
cure the section affords, are those sellers who actually knew before-
hand that the goods were not conforming, but had reasonable 
grounds to believe that the buyer would retain them in spite of their 
nonconformity. This essentially is the classic Nordstrom position so 
forcefully decried in Joe Oil USA, Ine. 99 The major objection to this 
somewhat restrictive literal reading of section 2-508(2) is that sellers 
who knew they were delivering nonconforming goods were afforded 
the cure remedy, while "innocent" sellers who did not, and perhaps 
could not,Ioo know of the nonconformity were not given an addi-
tional reasonable amount of time to cure. If left at this level, it 
would indeed seem unfair to permit those who knowingly breach to 
cure while denying innocent breaching persons such as retailers a 
similar right. This clearly is the dilemma that led the Joe Oil USA 
court to afford the seller the right to cure. IoI 
A relatively simple way to avoid this apparent injustice is to 
charge all sellers with knowledge of nonconformities. Comment 2 to 
section 2-508(2) states that "[t]he seller is charged with commercial 
knowledge of any factors in a particular sales situation which re-
quire him to comply strictly with his obligations under the contract 
.... "I02 This would impute constructive knowledge of the noncon-
formity to sellers who do not "open the crates," thus permitting 
such sellers to assert that they initially qualify for the right to cure 
under section 2-508(2) by knowing that the goods were not con-
forming. The result of such "imputed knowledge" would be that 
both innocent and knowing sellers of nonconforming goods could 
cure if they had "reasonable grounds to believe [that goods] would 
be acceptable."Ios It is at this point that the academic focus on the 
"reasonable grounds to believe" test becomes useful. Rather than 
99. 107 Misc. 2d 376, 434 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. U.C.C. § 2-508(2), supra note 3. 
103. See U.C.C. § 2-508(2), supra note 3. 
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equating "acceptable" with "conforming" and suffering the confu-
sion that results, courts could address in each instance the question 
of whether or not a seller, knowing that the goods were not con-
forming, had reasonable grounds to believe that the buyer would re-
tain such nonconforming goods in spite of the nonconformity. The 
literature surrounding the "reasonable grounds to believe" test em-
phasizes the factors of good faith and the magnitude of the defect. 
As we discussed above, the combination of the use of these tests 
without a clear understanding of the class of sellers to which they 
apply and the misequation of the words "acceptable" and "con-
forming" has resulted in confusion and lack of predictability. 
The concepts of good faith and substantial defect can actually be 
seen to work hand-in-hand once the word "acceptable" is taken lit-
erally. Assuming the seller knows that the goods are not conforming, 
when will that seller have reasonable grounds to believe that the 
buyer will retain them? Professor Hawkland argues that the buyer's 
right to reject implies a good faith rejection.104 He then makes use of 
the magnitude of defect test to ascertain whether the rejection was 
made in good faith or not. Substantially defective goods are always 
subject to rejection, while goods having only minor defects are 
not. 105 The problem with this analysis is that it recognizes no dis-
tinction between merchant and nonmerchant buyers, whereas the 
Code makes a clear distinction between the good faith requirements 
of merchants and nonmerchants. The test of good faith for the 
nonmerchant is honesty in fact. 106 The merchant, however, is re-
quired to be not only subjectively honest, but is further held to the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the 
trade.107 Recognizing this distinction aids in understanding the situ-
ations in which a buyer's rejection can be seen to be made in good 
faith. 
Because merchants are held to the more objective commercial 
standards of the trade, it becomes understandable that a seller 
would be genuinely surprised by a rejection from a merchant buyer 
on the grounds of an insubstantial nonconformity.108 Indeed, if such 
a seller could establish that it was not a practice in the trade or that 
the merchant buyer had accepted goods with minor nonconformities 
104. See Hawkland, supra note 24. 
105. Id. See supra note 28. 
106. See supra note 28. 
107. See supra note 28. 
108. See Hawkland, supra note 24. 
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in the past, he would have established both that the merchant buyer 
did not act in good faith and that his own belief that the goods 
would be accepted was reasonable.109 A buyer purchasing a $100,000 
printing press, for example, could not in good faith reject the press 
and cancel the contract because of a scratch on the front panel. For 
merchant buyers, then, the good faith and magnitude of defect tests 
work together to give fairly objective guidelines to the rejection-cure 
interplay. 
The situation changes drastically, however, when we substitute a 
consumer buyer for the merchant buyer. The good faith required of 
a consumer purchaser is mere honesty in fact-a subjective test. 
Certainly when the defect is major, the consumer purchaser (as well 
as the merchant buyer) should have the ability to reject and cancel. 
Even had the consumer accepted the goods by definition, his right 
to revoke his acceptance would remain if a substantial defect ex-
ists.110 What about the new car that is scratched, however, or the 
television with a reddish tinge? It is hard to believe that such a con-
sumer, in all subjective honesty, would not prefer a new item rather 
than a "repainted" or "fixed" television. Indeed, when the seller 
readily exchanges the good for a new item, the consumer buyer will 
normally accept the new item and the rejection-cure relationship be-
comes moot. Sellers, however, are more likely to want to cure by 
fixing the item, as is shown in the Wilson and Zabriskie cases. m 
Should the consumer buyer be forced to accept such cure, even if 
the defect was only minor, or should the consumer buyer be afforded 
the right to reject and cancel, demanding a brand new product in 
place of the nonconforming product (and, in effect, agreeing to a 
new contract)? The answer, of course, depends upon the proper in-
terpretation of the seller's right to cure under section 2-508(2). 
Piecing the parts of the section 2-508(2) puzzle together in light 
of the issues discussed provides a clearer picture. The sellers who 
may attempt to assert section 2-508(2) are sellers who have either 
actual or constructive knowledge that the goods sent were not con-
forming. These sellers must then show, to rightfully claim an addi-
tional reasonable amount of time to substitute conforming tender, 
that they had reasonable grounds to believe that the buyer would 
retain the goods in spite of their nonconformity. Can sellers in good 
109. See supra notes 3 & 29. 
110. See supra note 76. 
111. Zabriskie Chevrolet, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968); Wilson v. 
Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967). 
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faith reasonably expect merchant buyers to retain the goods if the 
nonconformity is minor? The answer is obviously in the affirmative. 
Can sellers in good faith reasonably expect consumer buyers to re-
tain the goods if the nonconformity is minor? The answer is obvi-
ously in the negative. 
The controversy and confusion surrounding the rejection-cure in-
terplay need not have occurred had courts initially read section 2-
508(2) and section 2-601 literally. A literal reading gives the buyer 
the right to reject for any nonconformity. This "perfect tender rule" 
could have remained strong had the courts literally read section 2-
508(2) to apply only to those sellers who knew beforehand that the 
goods were not conforming, but had a reasonable belief that they 
would be accepted in spite of the nonconformity. Almost blindly, 
however, the courts followed the early case of Wilson v. Scampoli 
and included in the class of sellers afforded the section 2-508(2) 
right to cure sellers who did not know that the goods were noncon-
forming.112 This naturally generated a substantial-insubstantial test 
not literally found in either the sections or the comments to section 
2-508 and section 2-601. 
Recognizing that courts feel compelled for reasons of justice to 
aid innocent or unknowing sellers of nonconforming goods just as 
they are directed to aid knowing sellers of nonconforming goods, we 
have proposed a "constructive knowledge of defect" rule to bring 
both innocent and knowing sellers of nonconforming goods under 
section 2-508(2); however, if the courts recognize that "acceptable" 
cannot be equated with "conforming," the breadth of the seller's 
right to cure remains limited to those surprising situations where 
merchant buyers reject for insubstantial defects. We feel that this 
understanding of the rejection-cure relationship provides more ob-
jective tests to ascertain section 2-508(2)'s proper scope and thereby 
affords a predictive aspect to the rejection-cure relationship not cur-
rently available. The final result will be that sellers will once again 
know what they are expected to deliver, and buyers will know what 
to expect. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A survey of both the case law and the commentary on section 2-
508(2) demonstrates that it has been the subject of inconsistent in-
terpretation. As a consequence, it is difficult to predict when or 
112. See cases cited supra note 49. 
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under what circumstances a seller will be permitted to cure a non-
conforming tender after the time for performance has expired. 
Our analysis indicates that a right to cure under section 2-508(2) 
should depend on whether or not the seller had reasonable grounds 
to believe the tender would be acceptable. Whether reasonable 
grounds exist for the seller's belief would depend on all factors in-
volved in the particular sales transaction. Furthermore, the fact that 
a seller is ignorant of a defect in the product should not result in an 
automatic right to cure. The seller should be charged with knowl-
edge of the true condition of what he is selling. Such an approach is 
consistent with the language of section 2-508(2) and can easily be 
applied by the courts. If this approach is used, section 2-508(2) will 
truly provide a uniform standard for determining a seller's right to 
cure while preserving and protecting already existing rights and 
remedies of a buyer under the Code. 

